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This paper explores the relationship between gerrymandering and home loan discrimination. 
Gerrymandering, the process of manipulating district plans for political gain, and discrimination in 
mortgage lending are both illegal; and yet, they still occur in today’s society. By using individual loan 
application data from the HMDA’s website, a series of regressions will be run using applicant 
characteristics to measure loan discrimination at the state level. Once a state level model has been 
constructed, a measure of gerrymandering called the Efficiency Gap will be added into the regression in 
order to explore the relationship between home loan discrimination and gerrymandering. Regression results 
suggest the presence of gerrymandering in a state is associated with more loan discrimination. A 
relationship of this nature is cause for further, in-depth research. This relationship could suggest that 
lenders and lawmakers are working collectively to keep minorities in one voting district. In doing so, the 
power of these individuals’ vote is effectively diminished. Seeing as every citizen is supposed to have equal 
access and opportunity to vote, this presents a new avenue for law makers to explore to further curtail both 
of these unethical actions. 
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The location of a person’s residence has a large impact on future life experiences 
and opportunities because it provides access to things like quality education and safe 
neighborhoods. When people talk about the American dream, it often involves moving up 
in life to a stable financial position and ultimately, buying a home for oneself and one’s 
family. According to a Forbes article by Camilo Maldonado, “32% of applicants with less 
than perfect credit were denied mortgages in 2017” (2018). Of these applicants, high-
income minority families are being denied mortgage loans as often as low-income white 
families (Gotham, 2012). While other factors such as debt, credit score, and financial 
history can determine who is granted a mortgage loan, the aforementioned statistic 
suggests the presence of racial discrimination in lending. There is a vast literature 
exploring the existence of racial discrimination in mortgage lending. Rick Cohen explains 
that many people deny the existence of racism in lending by pointing out that the 
majority of low-income families are Black, and this is why Black families are denied 
more often. However, Cohen explains that the rather liberal distribution of subprime 
mortgage loans to those who had first been denied is a clear indicator of racism in lending 
(2008). In another piece, Vanessa Perry discusses the discrimination in the lending 
process and the disadvantages that follow (2019). This discrimination in mortgage loan 
lending is forcing the hand of many minority families by giving them no option but to 
live where housing prices are more affordable, in lower-income neighborhoods.  
Residents of low-income communities face many hardships such as lower-
performing public schools, environmental hazards (e.g., unclean water), increased 
violence, and many other difficulties (Sacks, 2018). Another, more threatening 
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disadvantage that people in poorer neighborhoods encounter is a lack of access to reliable 
healthcare (Reynolds, 1976). On top of all of this, persons in low-income neighborhoods 
are more likely to be socially isolated, meaning that they have fewer people in their close 
circle that they can have meaningful discussions with (Tigges, Browne, & Green, 2008). 
Residents of poor neighborhoods are more likely to fall victim to voter suppression as 
well. In the past couple of years, there have been numerous cases of voter suppression, 
which has, “a disenfranchising affect on racial and ethnic minorities, who are less likely 
than whites to possess a valid ID,” (Barreto, Nuño, Sanchez, & Walker, 2019). In 
addition, there is evidence to suggest that it is not just voter ID laws, but partisan control 
of the electoral college as well that diminishes the voting power of minorities (Hicks, 
McKee, Sellers, & Smith, 2015). 
Through a process that has been identified as gerrymandering, state legislatures 
draw districts so that the electoral college will be in favor of one political party or voting 
demographic (O’Loughlin, 2010). Essentially, when the district lines are drawn, those in 
charge will try to see to it that people of a particular characteristic are “packed” into a 
few districts so as to lessen the voting power of the designated group had they been 
spread out over several districts. Alternatively, sometimes voting blocs can be “cracked” 
across many districts so that they are the minority vote in several districts as opposed to 
being the majority vote in a few districts (Warrington, 2018). Both methods of 
gerrymandering tamper with deserving citizens’ right to vote by diminishing the power of 
their vote. Both methods attempt to manipulate the outcome of an election, in essence, 
diminishing the power of voters in the targeted demographics. Fixing elections by taking 
powers from the voters is both unethical and unconstitutional. Redistricting occurs every 
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ten years after the decennial census, meaning that these plans can potentially affect ten 
years’ worth of elections. And yet, because redrawing districts is such a meticulous and 
somewhat subjective task, gerrymandering can go undetected. 
If the people in power can consolidate all of a particular demographic of voters in 
a given state into one district, the power these underprivileged members of society once 
had is effectively taken from them. It naturally follows that one might suggest these 
Black citizens move out of their gerrymandered district in order for their voice to be 
heard. Here is where this paper aims to add to the literature by drawing the connection 
between racial discrimination in mortgage loan lending and living in a gerrymandered 
district. Once placed in these gerrymandered districts, voting-aged Black men and 
women are stripped of their power to vote politicians into office who will advocate for 
their concerns, thus perpetuating the system of discrimination because they cannot get 
access to loans for more expensive homes in other districts. Throughout this paper, the 
prior research done on gerrymandering and loan discrimination will be explored then a 
new contribution to the literature will be added by providing a model that measures the 
effect of gerrymandering on racial discrimination in mortgage lending. 
Literature Review  
Discrimination in Mortgage Loan Lending 
 Several published studies have looked into discrimination, specifically racial 
discrimination, in the mortgage loan lending process. Discrimination use to be a fairly 
easy practice to detect, and some banks had explicit policies that directed their loan 
officers to do so. For example, in the 1970s it was found that many financial institutions 
had told their mortgage lenders to discount a wife’s income by 50 percent or more, 
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especially if she was of child-bearing age or had young children (Ladd, 1998). Then 
through the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the 1974 Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act, racial and gender discrimination in loan lending was made illegal. 
However, evidence suggests that racial and gender discrimination did not end there. 
In 1992, well after the passage of these two laws barring the practice of racial 
discrimination in mortgage lending, the Boston Fed did a study on 131 financial 
institutions in the Boston Metropolitan Statistical Area. Authors Alicia H. Munnell, Lynn 
E. Browne, James McEneaney, and Geoffrey M. B. Tootell found that racial 
discrimination was to blame for the disproportionate denial rates of minority applicants 
when compared to their white counterparts (1992). This study drew a lot of negative 
attention and claims of incorrect findings, so a follow up study was done a couple years 
later to check the validity of those findings by Dennis Glennon and Mitchell Stengel. 
They agreed with the Boston Fed’s conclusion that racial discrimination was rampant 
amongst financial institutions in Boston (1994).  
A study by Margery Austin Turner and Felicity Skidmore reviewed and critiqued 
several published pieces on racial discrimination in mortgage lending. Their findings 
were that racial discrimination happens on an individual level due to a loan lender’s own 
prejudices and on a structural level. The structural level discrimination was discovered 
when FHA-insured loans were compared to conventional loans. FHA-insured loans are 
government-backed and often are more flexible but with higher rates or fees for the 
borrower. Conventional loans on the other hand are insured by private lenders and are 
often less flexible in their approval process but with the benefit of lower payments, fees, 
and rates. All else equal, minority applicants are pushed toward FHA-insured loans more 
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than White applicants, which would explain why the discrimination present in the 
conventional loan market is much higher than that of the FHA-insured loan market. 
Without the direct presence of the government in the conventional loan lending process, 
private institutions are more apt to partake in racially discriminatory lending practices at 
large. An important distinction made in this review of published findings was that racial 
discrimination in mortgage lending is often disputed with the evidence that minority 
applicants on average are of lower creditworthiness than White applicants so it would 
naturally follow that their denial rates are higher (1999). However, several published 
works, like that of Stephen L. Ross and John Yinger, have found that equally credit 
worthy minority applicants are being denied a loan or given less favorable amounts or 
rates than their White counterparts. Additionally, their book mentions how discrimination 
can happen at any stage of the loan lending process, including preapproval, loan 
approval, and setting the terms of the mortgage loan (2002).  
Yet again, a qualitative study by Douglas S. Massey, Jacob S. Rugh, Justin P. 
Steil, and Len Albright looked into statements from loan officers in fair lending lawsuits 
and found that 76 percent of the statements suggested the presence of structural 
discrimination in the lending process, while only 11 percent were indicative of individual 
discrimination based on the loan officer’s personal biases (2016). These published 
findings and so many others have time and time again shown that despite the passage of 
the Housing Act of 1968 and the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, racial 




Gerrymandering was made unconstitutional with the passage of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965. Stated in this new legislation is the illegality of any, “voting practices and 
procedures (including redistricting plans) that discriminate on the basis of race, color or 
membership in a language minority group” (U.S. Department of Justice, 2020). The first 
major court case regarding gerrymandering was presented to the Supreme Court of the 
United States in 1993. A group of North Carolina residents challenged the North Carolina 
1992 redistricting plan, claiming it had been racially gerrymandered. What was special 
about this case is that North Carolina elected officials were attempting to give greater 
representation to Black voters in the state. However, they had drawn in a second majority 
Black district that was so disproportionate to the point where some areas of the district 
were, “no wider than the interstate road along which it stretched” (Shaw v. Reno, 
1993).The case was first brought to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
North Caroline in 1992 under the name Pope v. Blue but was dismissed on lack of 
evidence of racial gerrymandering (Pope v. Blue, 1992). When the case was tried again, 
the plaintiffs in Shaw v. Reno modified the question before the court to ask whether or 
not racial gerrymandering, especially in cases of benefiting minority voters, raised a valid 
constitutional issue. The Supreme Court ruled that although the intentions of the district 
plan were noble, the plan was unconstitutional because it was still manipulated for 
political gain. An article written by The Washington Post found the ten most 
gerrymandered districts in 2012. Maryland, a historically blue state, and North Carolina, 
a historically red state, were tied for the most gerrymandered states (Ingraham). An 
important point to make here is that gerrymandering is bipartisan; this is an issue on both 
sides of the aisle. However, when it comes to race, it is not so equal; gerrymandering 
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primarily affects Black Americans and the power of their vote (Issacharoff & Goldstein, 
1996).  
In two different studies, Stephanopoulos, and McGhee (2018 & 2014) explore the 
differences in the Efficiency Gap and the declination metric. The Efficiency Gap 
measures how many lost votes a given state has. Defining lost votes comes in two parts: 
districts with the presence of “packing” and districts with the presence of “cracking.” In 
districts with the presence of “packing” one demographic into a given area, all the votes 
for a candidate over the maximum percentage it takes to win would be considered lost 
because they were unnecessary to secure the seat for the winning candidate. On the 
flipside, districts with the presence of “cracking,” or spreading out a certain voting 
demographic amongst multiple districts, would define lost votes as the number of votes 
for a losing candidate. In a different study done by McGhee, he argues that it is important 
to use a measure as detailed with respect to measuring individual votes as the Efficiency 
Gap when detecting gerrymandering (2017). As can be seen in Equation (1), to ensure the 
EG =
|𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐵𝐵′𝑠𝑠 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐴𝐴′𝑠𝑠 𝑊𝑊𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠|
𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁
 
Efficiency Gap is a nonpartisan measure, the absolute value of the numerator was taken. 
Throughout the rest of this paper, the Efficiency Gap will be utilized as a metric for 
detecting gerrymandering in a given state. 
There is much debate over a good way to quantify gerrymandering. Of the current 
research on quantifying gerrymandering, the majority of them are mathematical models 
that can show the existence of gerrymandering via computer algorithms. Padilla, Ratliff, 




use a metric of asymmetry amongst seats won and the vote distribution called declination. 
This metric was defined by Gregory Warren in another study that was also aiming to 
quantify gerrymandering (2018). Put simply, the declination metric is calculated by 
plotting the vote distribution of a state and the seats won by each party in order to find an 
angular difference in the two measures. Padilla, Ratliff, and Veomett (2018) used an 
algorithm to plot thousands of different potential outcomes for a state to see if the 
declination varied significantly from zero. Essentially, a zero measure of declination 
states that vote shares and seat shares are evenly distributed. A declination coefficient 
greater or less than zero suggests the presence of gerrymandering. However, because of 
the limited number of available seats in every state and the natural distribution of people 
throughout a given state, it’s extremely unlikely that the vote share will exactly equal the 
awarded seat distribution in states that don’t actually have any presence of 
gerrymandering. So, by running the algorithm, it aims to compare whether the declination 
coefficient is an extreme variation of the baseline cases that are possible for a given state. 
With all of this said, there is debate over whether or not the declination model is a better 
measure of gerrymandering than the Efficiency Gap. 
Model 
 The regression model used to test the effects of gerrymandering and race on 
mortgage loan approval is shown in Equation (2). The dummy variable for approval is  
A = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 EG + 𝛽𝛽2BB + 𝛽𝛽3 BW + 𝛽𝛽4 BO + 𝛽𝛽5 WB + 𝛽𝛽6WO + 𝛽𝛽7 OB + 𝛽𝛽8OW +  
𝛽𝛽9OO + 𝛽𝛽10ln(L) + 𝛽𝛽11ln(I) + 𝛽𝛽12P + 𝛽𝛽13F + 𝛽𝛽14HH + 𝛽𝛽15HN + 𝛽𝛽16NH + 𝜀𝜀 
denoted as “A” and the Efficiency Gap is denoted as “EG”. The second through ninth 




represents the applicant’s race and the second later signifies the co-applicant’s race. The 
letter “B” stands for Black applicants or co-applicants, “W” stands for White applicants 
or co-applicants, and “O” stands for Other applicants or co-applicants. The variable 
“ln(L)” stands for the natural log of the loan amount being applied for and “ln(I)” 
represents the natural log of the applicant’s income. A dummy variable for whether 
someone was preapproved is denoted by the letter “P” and the dummy variable for an 
applicant’s gender is denoted with an “F” equal to one for female applicants and zero for 
male applicants. The last three variables are the applicant/co-applicant ethnicity 
interaction variables with the first letter representing the applicant’s ethnicity and the 
second letter representing the co-applicant’s ethnicity. A Hispanic applicant or co-
applicant is represented by an “H” and a Non-Hispanic applicant or co-applicant is 
represented with an “N.” The White applicant applying with a White co-applicant 
variable, the Non-Hispanic applicant applying with a Non-Hispanic co-applicant variable, 
and the male variable will be omitted to avoid collinearity. The FHA-insured loan and 
conventional loan variables were also omitted from this model because separate 
regressions were run for each type of loan as opposed to putting them in the model. 
The unit of observation is a single applicant. All variables, aside from the 
Efficiency Gap, are measured using individual applications for mortgage loan data from 
across the country. The Metropolitan Statistical Division of each applicant/co-applicant 
pair is recorded, the Efficiency Gap is measured at the state level so the model only 
specifies geographic application details at the state level. Of all the information provided 
in the loan dataset; income, loan amount, gender, applicant and co-applicant race and 
ethnicity, and preapproval are included in the model. It is expected that the income 
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variable will have a positive coefficient, because an increase in income would suggest 
that one is more apt to repay their loan, thus warranting a higher chance of being 
approved. The loan amount variable is expected to have a negative coefficient, seeing as 
an increase in the size of the loan implies larger monthly mortgage payments and a 
greater likelihood of not being able to make one of those payments, a reason to hesitate 
on approving an applicant. The natural log was taken of the loan amount and income 
variables so as to identify the effects of percentage changes in these variables and reduce 
the effects of high-end outliers. As for the gender variables, it is expected that females 
will have a negative coefficient because gender discrimination is prevalent in the loan 
approval process (Fang & Munneke, 2016). The preapproval variable coefficient estimate 
is expected to be positive because the preapproval process is indicating whether or not 
someone is financially sound enough to repay a loan, thus increasing one’s chances of 
being approved. 
 As for the ethnicity, race, and Efficiency Gap variables, all are expected to have 
negative coefficients. As discussed above, there is previously published evidence to 
suggest racial and ethnic discrimination exists in the mortgage loan lending process. 
Thus, it would be expected that a White applicant applying with a White co-applicant 
(the omitted racial category) would have the highest chance of getting approved, and 
every other applicant/co-applicant race pairing would have a lower likelihood of being 
approved due to racial discrimination. The same can be said for the Non-Hispanic 
applicant applying with a Non-Hispanic co-applicant (the omitted ethnic category), where 
that pairing would have the highest likelihood of being approved while the other 
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applicant/co-applicant ethnic pairings would have a lower likelihood of being approved 
due to ethnic discrimination. 
The regression model is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The 
Efficiency Gap measure is measured as a percentage. All other variables are dummy 
variables. One thing to note before continuing is that any coefficient results obtained 
from this model indicate the relationship between that variable and the likelihood of 
being approved for a loan, but are not necessarily causal effects. 
The largest assumption made for this analysis is that if one was denied a mortgage 
loan, they were going to be living in the same neighborhood or voting district as before 
and that if approved for a mortgage loan they could be moving to a new neighborhood or 
voting district. Since old residence and desired residence of an applicant and co-applicant 
pair were not available via this dataset, this assumption allows for the connection to be 
made between being denied a mortgage loan and how that exacerbates the effects of 
gerrymandering because one is not only barred from buying a new home, but they are 
also barred from being moved to a new voting district. 
Data Analysis 
When compiling my data, I utilized MIT’s Election Lab for the gerrymandering 
data and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) website for public 
mortgage loan data disclosed under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). All 
variables and their sources are shown in Table 1 in Appendix A. The data for calculating 
the efficiency gap are from the House of Representatives elections because the large 
number of representatives better captures the disparity between vote share and seat share. 
The CFPB data are from thousands of financial institutions across the country that report 
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their mortgage loan application information by releasing detailed information on each 
loan application. Application data from 2007 was used for the regressions. Election 
results from 2004 were used in the regression for 2007 loan applicants in order to account 
for the delayed effect between when politicians are elected and when the effects of the 
policies they enacted trickle down to the civilian level. A study done by Richard T. 
Smith, Michele Scheumack, and Ian Eddington discussed the problem of there being a 
time lag between when an issue is brough to the public’s attention and when legislation 
that has been passed finally addresses that issue (n.d.). Seeing as House of Representative 
elections are every other year, 2004 data was chosen over 2006 data because a year (2006 
to 2007) is still not always enough time for politicians, especially newly elected ones, to 
pass legislation that can have an effect on discriminatory practices in day to day life. 
 Because the CFPB dataset is so detailed, it needs to be cleaned up before 
regressions are run. First, the natural log was taken of the loan amount and income 
variables. Next, the applicant/co-applicant race and ethnicity interaction variables were 
created. Each paring is a dummy variable, with a 1 denoting if the applicant/co-applicant 
pair is that racial or ethnic pairing, and a 0 if they are not. Only owner occupied, single-
family homes are used for the regressions because the question at hand is concerned with 
how individuals or families purchasing a home are affected by the relationship between 
gerrymandering and racial discrimination in mortgage loan lending. The applications in 
the data set that applied for mortgage loan refinancing or loans for home improvement 
are also left out of the regression because this paper is strictly focused on mortgage loans 
for home purchases. Lastly, mortgage loan applications for Veterans Administration 
guaranteed loans and Farm Service Agency or Rural Housing Services loans are omitted 
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because applicants have to meet certain criteria to apply for these loans, and they go 
through a different process than for conventional or FHA-insured loans. The final 
regression sample includes 269,491 applications. 
 I also consider whether FHA-insured loans and conventional loans may have 
different levels of discrimination. Therefore, regressions are estimated for all loans, and 
then split into separate regressions for FHA-insured loan applications and conventional 
loan applications. There were 13,792 FHA-insured loan applications and 255,699 
conventional loan applications. The last two sets of regressions run were looking at the 
differences between those who were preapproved and those who were not. Of the 19,894 
preapproved applications, 18,522 were for conventional loans and 1, 372 were for FHA-
insured loans. Of the 246,982 non-preapproved applications, 234,713 were for 
conventional loans and 12,269 were for FHA-insured loans. All four regressions had a 
large enough sample to get meaningful regression results. 
 Looking at the summary statistics in Table 1, it appears that no one applicant/co-
applicant racial or ethnic pairing makes up an overwhelming percentage of the 
applications. White applicants applying with a White-co-applicant, White applicants 
applying with a Non-White or -Black co-applicant, and Non-Hispanic applicants 
applying with a Non-Hispanic co-applicant made up the largest percentage of 
applications. Male applicants made up the majority of applications. A little bit more than 
half of the applications in the dataset were approved for loans. A separate table of 
summary statistics filtered by FHA-insured loan applicants and conventional loan 
applicants is shown in Appendix A Table 2. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Empirical Analysis 
Confirming Published Findings 
 In order to begin any discussions on the effect of gerrymandering on mortgage 
loan discrimination, it must first be shown that the data gathered was consistent with 




  Max 
Approved 269,491 0.616 0.486 0 0 1 1 1 
Efficiency Gap 269,491 0.122 0.099 0.003 0.051 0.101 0.172 0.426 
Black Applicant, 
Black Co-Applicant 
269,491 0.021 0.142 0 0 0 0 1 
Black Applicant 
White Co-Applicant 
269,491 0.002 0.048 0 0 0 0 1 
Black Applicant 
Other Co-Applicant 
269,491 0.096 0.295 0 0 0 0 1 
White Applicant 
Black Co-Applicant 
269,491 0.002 0.040 0 0 0 0 1 
White Applicant 
White Co-Applicant 
269,491 0.310 0.462 0 0 0 1 1 
White Applicant 
Other Co-Applicant 
269,491 0.438 0.496 0 0 0 1 1 
Other Applicant 
Black Co-Applicant 
269,491 0.000 0.019 0 0 0 0 1 
Other Applicant 
White Co-Applicant 




269,491 0.126 0.332 0 0 0 0 1 
Loan Amount 269,491 4.91 0.953 2.565 2.304 4.970 5.561 9.908 
Income 269,491 4.331 0.735 2.773 3.850 4.290 4.771 9.210 
Preapproved 269,491 0.076 0.265 0 0 0 0 1 
Female 269,491 0.330 0.470 0 0 0 1 1 

















269,491 0.312 0.463 0 0 0 1 1 
Rice 15 
 
prior literature. The income variable in Table 2 Column 1 suggests that a 10 percent 
increase in one’s income will result in a 1.04 percentage point increase in the likelihood 
of being approved. Related to this, the coefficient on the loan amount variable signifies a 
0.61 percentage point decrease in one’s likelihood of being approved for every 10 percent 
increase in the amount of the loan. Additionally, those who seek and are granted 
preapproval are 17.8 percentage points more likely to be approved. All three of these 
variables fit basic facts about taking out a mortgage loan according to the FDIC (2018). 
 As discussed above, previous findings have determined that there is gender and 
racial discrimination in the mortgage lending process. This regression found that women 
are 2.6 percentage points less likely to be approved than men. Additionally, all non-white 
applicants as well as Hispanic applicants were less likely to be approved than their white 
counterpart. Notably, Black applicants were least likely to be approved at 24 percentage 
points less likely to be approved than a White applicant. Those who chose not to disclose 
their race are the second least likely to be approved at almost half the rate of Black 
applicants. These results are consistent with the previous studies mentioned above. 
Conventional vs. FHA-Insured Loans 
 As discussed above, FHA-insured loans are much easier to be approved for than 
conventional loans. Subsequently, it would be expected that discrimination is higher in 
the more competitive conventional loan market than the FHA-insured loan market. To 
confirm that the results matched this statement, two separate regressions were run: one 
for just conventional loan applicants in Table 2 Column 2 and one for FHA-insured loan 
applicants in Column 3. The results for the conventional loan regression are close to the 
original regression in Table 2 Column 1, with all coefficients only increasing or 
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Table 2: Previous Findings and Conventional vs. FHA-Insured Loans  
Notes: Robust standard errors are noted in the parentheses below each coefficient estimate. The asterisks 
next to the coefficient estimates are indicative of the statistical level of significance: * denotes significance 
at the 0.10 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level.  
decreasing by a percentage point or two. Black applicants are still the least likely to be 
approved at 25 percentage points when compared to White applicants.  
The FHA-insured loan regression yields slightly different results. First, the results 
show that women were 0.8 percentage points more likely to be approved than men for an 
FHA-insured loan, but not at a statistically significant level. This suggests that women 
are not discriminated against when applying for an FHA-insured loan. Also noteworthy is 
that every 10 percent increase in an applicant’s income is now related to a 1.74 
  1 2 3 
VARIABLES 2007 Conventional FHA-Insured 
Conventional Loan 0.059***   
 [0.004]   
Loan Amount -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.059*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.010] 
Income 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.174*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.010] 
Preapproved 0.178*** 0.179*** 0.160*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.013] 
Female Applicant -0.026*** -0.028*** 0.008 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.009] 
Hispanic Applicant -0.110*** -0.115*** -0.014 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.011] 
American Indian Applicant -0.072*** -0.087*** 0.103*** 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.034] 
Asian Applicant -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.024 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.036] 
Black Applicant -0.240*** -0.250*** -0.130*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.011] 
Pacific Islander Applicant -0.108*** -0.119*** 0.120** 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.052] 
Race Not Disclosed Applicant -0.150*** -0.149*** -0.170*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.020] 
Constant 0.464*** 0.535*** 0.132*** 
 [0.007] [0.006] [0.043] 
Observations 269,491 255,699 13,792 
R-squared 0.073 0.073 0.050 
Rice 17 
 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of being approved for an FHA-insured loan, 
whereas with the original and conventional regressions there was only a 1.04 and 1.02 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of being approved, respectively. Looking at 
the race and ethnicity variables; American Indian, Black, and Pacific Islander applicants 
in addition to applicants who chose not to disclose their race are the only statistically 
significant race-related coefficients. American Indian and Pacific Islander applicants 
actually became 10.3 and 12 percentage points more likely to be approved for an FHA-
insured loan than a White applicant, respectively. Those who did not disclose their race 
became even less likely to be approved for an FHA-insured loan dropping down to 17 
percentage points. Finally, Black applicants are now only 13 percentage points less likely 
to be approved. Both the conventional and FHA-insured loan regressions suggest that 
there is evidence of racial discrimination in both markets, but that the conventional loan 
market is much more discriminatory. 
Applicant/Co-Applicant Races 
 When applying for a loan, applying with a co-applicant can increase one’s 
chances of being approved. Because a co-applicant often represents a second income 
stream, loan officers find applications with a co-applicant more creditworthy (Kagan, 
2020). Table 3 Columns 1 and 2 show a regression for conventional and FHA-insured 
applicants and co-applicant pairs. The race categories were consolidated from the 
previous regressions in Table 2 into the Black, White, and Other categories. This was due 
to the fact that Black applicants had the most statistically significant results and White 
applicants are the comparison point to which all other race categories are being 
compared. All other races, including those who chose not to disclose their race, were 
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merged into the “Other” category. Black applicants applying with a Black co-applicant 
are 26.5 percentage points less likely to be approved for a conventional loan and 14.1 
percentage points less likely to be approved for an FHA-insured loan, still fitting the 
previous findings discussed above. Furthermore, Black applicants applying with a Non-
Black and Non-White co-applicant are 33 and 12.7 percentage points less likely to be 
approved for a conventional and FHA-insured mortgage loan, respectively. Both 
variables in the FHA-insured and conventional loan regressions were statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 3: Simplified Co-Applicant Pairings 
  1 2 
VARIABLES Conventional B,W,Other FHA-Insured B,W,Other 
Loan Amount -0.060*** -0.058*** 
 [0.001] [0.011] 
Income 0.094*** 0.177*** 
 [0.002] [0.010] 
Preapproved 0.177*** 0.159*** 
 [0.003] [0.013] 
Female Applicant -0.010*** 0.008 
 [0.002] [0.009] 
H Applicant H Co-Applicant -0.106*** -0.013 
 [0.005] [0.017] 
H Applicant Non-H Co-Applicant -0.042*** -0.036 
 [0.011] [0.049] 
Non-H Applicant H Co-Applicant -0.047*** 0.009 
 [0.011] [0.048] 
B Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.265*** -0.141*** 
 [0.007] [0.019] 
W Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.130*** -0.045 
 [0.024] [0.078] 
B Applicant O Co-Applicant -0.330*** -0.127*** 
 [0.004] [0.014] 
W Applicant O Co-Applicant -0.127*** 0.006 
 [0.002] [0.011] 
O Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.268*** -0.194 
 [0.052] [0.149] 
O Applicant O Co-Applicant -0.165*** -0.087*** 
 [0.003] [0.018] 
Constant 0.618*** 0.110** 
 [0.007] [0.046] 
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Observations 255,699 13,792 
R-squared 0.075 0.046 
Notes: The applicant/co-applicant abbreviations are as follows: Black (B), White (W), Other (O). Robust 
standard errors are noted in the parentheses below each coefficient estimate. The asterisks next to the 
coefficient estimates are indicative of the statistical level of significance: * denotes significance at the 0.10 
level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level.  
Gerrymandering Effects 
Table 4: Gerrymandering Effects  













2004 EG -0.120*** -0.491*** -0.094*** -0.322*** 
 [0.011] [0.054] [0.017] [0.102] 
Loan Amount -0.061*** -0.058*** -0.061*** -0.057*** 
 [0.001] [0.011] [0.001] [0.011] 
Income 0.090*** 0.170*** 0.090*** 0.170*** 
 [0.002] [0.010] [0.002] [0.010] 
Preapproved 0.196*** 0.170*** 0.196*** 0.171*** 
 [0.003] [0.013] [0.003] [0.013] 
Female Applicant -0.011*** 0.005 -0.011*** 0.005 
 [0.002] [0.009] [0.002] [0.009] 
H Applicant H Co-Applicant -0.112*** -0.023 -0.135*** 0.032 
 [0.005] [0.017] [0.009] [0.039] 
H Applicant Non-H Co-Applicant -0.046*** -0.040 -0.040** -0.073 
 [0.011] [0.049] [0.017] [0.076] 
Non-H Applicant H Co-Applicant -0.051*** 0.008 -0.031* -0.044 
 [0.011] [0.048] [0.017] [0.073] 
B Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.268*** -0.148*** -0.234*** -0.130*** 
 [0.007] [0.019] [0.011] [0.030] 
W Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.129*** -0.059 -0.087** -0.072 
 [0.024] [0.079] [0.035] [0.154] 
B Applicant O Co-Applicant -0.332*** -0.132*** -0.308*** -0.114*** 
 [0.004] [0.014] [0.006] [0.022] 
W Applicant O Co-Applicant -0.130*** 0.001 -0.132*** 0.019 
 [0.002] [0.011] [0.003] [0.017] 
O Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.274*** -0.207 -0.232*** -0.466* 
 [0.052] [0.150] [0.072] [0.265] 
O Applicant O Co-Applicant -0.169*** -0.092*** -0.154*** -0.038 
 [0.003] [0.018] [0.005] [0.025] 
(H Applicant H Co-Applicant) x EG    0.298*** -0.634 
   [0.093] [0.403] 
(H Applicant Non-H Co-Applicant) x EG   -0.072 0.397 
   [0.157] [0.650] 
(Non-H Applicant H Co-Applicant) x EG   -0.247 0.557 
   [0.159] [0.582] 
(B Applicant B Co-Applicant) x EG   -0.375*** -0.191 
   [0.089] [0.265] 
(B Applicant O Co-Applicant) x EG   -0.248*** -0.189 
   [0.045] [0.169] 
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(W Applicant B Co-Applicant) x EG   -0.511 0.252 
   [0.329] [1.891] 
(W Applicant O Co-Applicant) x EG   0.028 -0.194 
   [0.024] [0.133] 
(O Applicant B Co-Applicant) x EG   -0.581 3.449 
   [0.615] [4.436] 
(O Applicant O Co-Applicant) x EG   -0.188*** -0.624*** 
   [0.042] [0.196] 
Constant 0.653*** 0.191*** 0.651*** 0.175*** 
 [0.007] [0.046] [0.007] [0.047] 
     
Observations 253,235 13,641 253,235 13,641 
R-squared 0.077 0.054 0.078 0.055 
Notes: The applicant/co-applicant abbreviations are as follows: Black (B), White (W), Other (O). The 
interaction terms are denoted with “x EG” next to the variable. The Efficiency Gap is represented by “EG.” 
Robust standard errors are noted in the parentheses below each coefficient estimate. The asterisks next to 
the coefficient estimates are indicative of the statistical level of significance: * denotes significance at the 
0.10 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level.  
Adding the Efficiency Gap measure to the regressions, the results in Table 4 Columns 1 
and 2 show that gerrymandering has a negative relationship with being approved for a 
mortgage loan. Specifically, for conventional loan applicants, for every 1 percentage 
point increase in the Efficiency Gap of a state, an applicant is 0.12 percentage points less 
likely to be approved for a mortgage loan. The FHA-insured loan regression shows a 1 
percentage point increase in the Efficiency Gap of a state means an applicant is 0.491 
percentage points less likely to be approved. Both coefficients are statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level. Because we are most interested in the effects gerrymandering has on 
racial discrimination in mortgage lending, another set of regressions were created using 
the Efficiency Gap/applicant/co-applicant interaction variables. 
 The question being asked in this paper is not about how racial discrimination and 
gerrymandering independently affect one’s chances of being approved, but rather how the 
relationship between the two affect mortgage loan approval, so applicant/co-applicant 
and gerrymandering interaction terms are added to the regression. Table 4 Columns 3 and 
4 show the regressions with the new interaction variables included. Interacted variable 
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coefficients cannot be interpreted on their own; one must multiply the coefficient 
estimate on the interaction term by some value of the Efficiency Gap (e.g. 25th, 50th, 75th 
percentile, etc.) and then add it to the non-interacted applicant/co-applicant coefficient 
estimate. This will now show the effect of being an applicant of a n race applying with a 
co-applicant of n race on loan approval specifically when the Efficiency Gap is x. To give 
context, an Efficiency Gap measure of 0.5 would suggest that the winning party won 50% 
more seats than they would have if both parties had wasted an equal number of votes. If 
both parties waste an equal number of votes, it is assumed that voting districts are evenly 
drawn. The 50th percentile for the efficiency gap measure in all 50 states in 2004 was 
0.1011, meaning that the winning party won 10.11% more seats. Black applicants 
applying with a Black co-applicant in a state with a median Efficiency Gap of 0.1011 are 
27.2 percentage points and 14.9 percentage points less likely to be approved for a 
conventional and FHA-insured mortgage loan, respectively. This is not necessarily 
indicative of the presence of gerrymandering because in a state like Alaska, the winning 
party being given 10.11% more seats than the losing party does not have a meaningful 
interpretation seeing as there is only one House of Representatives seat given to Alaska, 
making it unclear whether gerrymandering is present at all because the winning party did 
not actually gain an additional seat. Thus, for these coefficient interpretations to hold 
value, it is important to identify a state with each chosen Efficiency Gap measure.  
Taking a look at Nebraska, a state with an Efficiency Gap measure of 0.128, the 
vote distribution was approximately 30% Democrat and 70% Republican. Of the 3 House 
of Representatives seats Nebraska had to fill that year, all 3 were awarded to Republican 
representatives. However, following the vote distribution, 1 Democrat and 2 Republican 
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representatives should have been elected which is clear evidence of gerrymandering. 
Using Table 4 Column 3, in a state with Nebraska’s Efficiency Gap, a Black applicant 
applying for a conventional loan with a Black co-applicant is now 28.2 percentage points 
less likely to be approved than a White applicant with a White co-applicant. Looking at 
the same criteria for FHA-insured loan applicants, Black applicants with a Black co-
applicant are 15.4 percentage points less likely to be approved than a White applicant 
with a White co-applicant. Even more striking in Table 4 Column 3, Black applicants 
applying with a non-White and non-Black co-applicant are 33.97 percentage points less 
likely to be approved for a conventional loan than a White applicant with a White co-
applicant in Nebraska. 
State Fixed Effects 
Table 5: State Fixed Effects 
  1 2 
VARIABLES Conventional B,W,Other FHA-Insured B,W,Other 
Loan Amount -0.058*** -0.102*** 
 [0.001] [0.012] 
Income 0.095*** 0.160*** 
 [0.002] [0.010] 
Preapproved 0.187*** 0.161*** 
 [0.003] [0.014] 
Female Applicant -0.014*** 0.005 
 [0.002] [0.009] 
H Applicant H Co-Applicant -0.155*** 0.063 
 [0.009] [0.041] 
H Applicant Non-H Co-Applicant -0.028* -0.022 
 [0.017] [0.077] 
Non-H Applicant H Co-Applicant -0.023 -0.026 
 [0.017] [0.069] 
B Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.238*** -0.095*** 
 [0.011] [0.031] 
W Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.099*** -0.032 
 [0.035] [0.154] 
B Applicant O Co-Applicant -0.301*** -0.085*** 
 [0.006] [0.023] 
W Applicant O Co-Applicant -0.124*** 0.009 
 [0.003] [0.016] 
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O Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.231*** -0.330* 
 [0.074] [0.193] 
O Applicant O Co-Applicant -0.145*** -0.075*** 
 [0.005] [0.025] 
(H Applicant H Co-Applicant) x EG  0.240*** -1.105*** 
 [0.093] [0.429] 
(H Applicant Non-H Co-Applicant) x EG -0.072 -0.031 
 [0.155] [0.700] 
(Non-H Applicant H Co-Applicant) x EG -0.240 0.400 
 [0.159] [0.557] 
(B Applicant B Co-Applicant) x EG -0.255*** -0.298 
 [0.090] [0.272] 
(B Applicant O Co-Applicant) x EG -0.132*** -0.292 
 [0.047] [0.181] 
(W Applicant B Co-Applicant) x EG -0.469 -0.116 
 [0.328] [1.875] 
(W Applicant O Co-Applicant) x EG 0.045* -0.149 
 [0.024] [0.133] 
(O Applicant B Co-Applicant) x EG -0.418 1.455 
 [0.655] [3.137] 
(O Applicant O Co-Applicant) x EG -0.207*** -0.401** 
 [0.042] [0.197] 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Constant 0.715*** 0.383 
 [0.060] [441.598] 
   
Observations 253,235 13,641 
R-squared 0.097 0.094 
Notes: The applicant/co-applicant abbreviations are as follows: Black (B), White (W), Other (O). The 
interaction terms are denoted with “x EG” next to the variable. The Efficiency Gap is represented by “EG.” 
Robust standard errors are noted in the parentheses below each coefficient estimate. The asterisks next to 
the coefficient estimates are indicative of the statistical level of significance: * denotes significance at the 
0.10 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. For 
formatting purposes, the state fixed effect variables have been hidden.  
To further strengthen the regressions, state fixed effects were added to the model. 
State fixed effects eliminate omitted variable bias regarding factors that are the same for 
all applicants in a given state. The use of state fixed effects eliminates the need to control 
for the efficiency gap on its own, as it is a state-level variable and the regression sample 
only includes one year of data. Table 5 Columns 1 and 2 show the state fixed effects 
regressions. Oregon, a state with an Efficiency Gap measure of 0.197, had a vote 
distribution of 53.7% Democrat and 43% Republican. Their seat distribution was 80% 
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Democrat and 20% Republican, an even clearer example of gerrymandering than in the 
Nebraska case. For conventional loan applicants in a state with Oregon’s efficiency gap, 
Black applicants applying with a Black co-applicant are 28.8 percentage points less likely 
to be approved than a White applicant with White co-applicant in the state fixed effects 
regression, where they were 30.8 percentage points less likely to be approved in the 
regression without state fixed effects. As for FHA-insure loan applicants in a state with 
Oregon’s efficiency gap, Black applicants applying with a Black co-applicant are 15 
percentage points less likely to be approved in the state fixed effects regression, while 
they were 16.8 percentage points less likely to be approved in the regression without state 
fixed effects. This slight decrease in the absolute magnitude of coefficient estimates 
suggests there were some unobserved state-level characteristics correlated with racial 
discrimination in the prior regressions, which are now controlled for by including state 
fixed effects.  
Preapproved vs Non-Preapproved 
Seeking pre-approval can have a large effect on being approved for a loan, thus 
the regressions were again split into different sets: those who were preapproved and those 
who were not preapproved. Table 6 Columns 1-4 shows the preapproved and not 
preapproved regressions. For those who were preapproved and applying for a 
conventional loan in a state like Florida, with an Efficiency Gap measure of 0.094, Black 
applicants applying with a Black applicant were 14.8  
Table 6: Preapproved vs. Not-Preapproved 
















Loan Amount -0.018*** -0.060* -0.060*** -0.100*** 
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 [0.004] [0.035] [0.001] [0.013] 
Income 0.102*** 0.076** 0.096*** 0.163*** 
 [0.006] [0.033] [0.002] [0.011] 
Female Applicant 0.009 -0.048* -0.016*** 0.009 
 [0.006] [0.025] [0.002] [0.009] 
H Applicant H Co-Applicant -0.043* 0.070 -0.164*** 0.059 
 [0.023] [0.152] [0.010] [0.043] 
H Applicant Non-H Co-Applicant -0.041 0.323* -0.025 -0.043 
 [0.045] [0.188] [0.018] [0.082] 
Non-H Applicant H Co-Applicant 0.001 -0.062 -0.024 -0.002 
 [0.038] [0.202] [0.018] [0.071] 
B Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.086** -0.040 -0.249*** -0.106*** 
 [0.039] [0.099] [0.011] [0.033] 
W Applicant B Co-Applicant 0.036 0.367** -0.110*** -0.112 
 [0.097] [0.155] [0.036] [0.161] 
B Applicant O Co-Applicant -0.067*** -0.036 -0.315*** -0.099*** 
 [0.022] [0.062] [0.006] [0.024] 
W Applicant O Co-Applicant -0.004 0.097*** -0.133*** -0.007 
 [0.010] [0.037] [0.003] [0.018] 
O Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.106 0.240 -0.229*** -0.400*** 
 [0.462] [0.168] [0.077] [0.154] 
O Applicant O Co-Applicant -0.072*** -0.017 -0.149*** -0.079*** 
 [0.016] [0.093] [0.005] [0.026] 
(H Applicant H Co-Applicant) x EG  0.076 -1.612 0.239** -1.071** 
 [0.217] [1.596] [0.101] [0.445] 
(H Applicant Non-H Co-Applicant) x EG 0.154 -4.351 -0.090 0.087 
 [0.382] [3.254] [0.169] [0.711] 
(Non-H Applicant H Co-Applicant) x EG 0.232 -2.557 -0.302* 0.443 
 [0.323] [2.311] [0.169] [0.546] 
(B Applicant B Co-Applicant) x EG -0.655** 0.375 -0.234** -0.355 
 [0.333] [0.952] [0.093] [0.287] 
(B Applicant O Co-Applicant) x EG -0.614*** -0.193 -0.096** -0.200 
 [0.181] [0.502] [0.048] [0.196] 
(W Applicant B Co-Applicant) x EG 0.352 -4.440*** -0.504 1.032 
 [0.726] [1.586] [0.337] [2.065] 
(W Applicant O Co-Applicant) x EG -0.205*** -0.791* 0.059** -0.036 
 [0.072] [0.414] [0.025] [0.141] 
(O Applicant B Co-Applicant) x EG -2.622  -0.408 1.712 
 [8.185]  [0.665] [2.847] 
(O Applicant O Co-Applicant) x EG -0.243* -0.584 -0.205*** -0.390* 
 [0.139] [0.651] [0.045] [0.204] 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.742*** 0.030 0.569 0.905*** 
 [0.058] [0.141] [.] [0.059] 
     
Observations 18,522 1,372 234,713 12,269 
R-squared 0.083 0.240 0.090 0.082 
Notes: The applicant/co-applicant abbreviations are as follows: Black (B), White (W), Other (O). The 
interaction terms are denoted with “x EG” next to the variable. The Efficiency Gap is represented by “EG.” 
Robust standard errors are noted in the parentheses below each coefficient estimate. The asterisks next to 
the coefficient estimates are indicative of the statistical level of significance: * denotes significance at the 
0.10 level; ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level; *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. For 
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formatting purposes, the state fixed effect variables have been hidden. All 4 regressions were run with both 
robust and cluster standard errors and regression results were the same for both errors. 
percentage points less likely to be approved for a loan than a White applicant with a 
White co-applicant, compared to those who were not preapproved being 27 percentage 
points less likely to be approved. As for those who were a applying for an FHA-insured 
loan in a state with Florida’s efficiency gap, a Black applicant applying with a Black co-
applicant was only 0.48 percentage points less likely to be approved if they were 
preapproved and 13.9 percentage points less likely to be approved if they were not 
preapproved. The preapproved FHA-insured loan regression coefficient was not 
statistically significant. While we can clearly see here that there is more discrimination in 
the group that does not have preapproval, this could be due in part to the fact that they 
were discriminated against in the preapproval process as well. This would further explain 
why discrimination seemed to decrease in the preapproved group. However, the 
hypothesis cannot be tested further because this data set does not give detailed 
information about the preapproval process.  
Additionally, the R-squared values for these regressions were quite low. 
However, with each set of additions to the regressions, the explanatory power increased, 
with the exception of the last four regressions that split the sample by pre-approved 
status. The R-squared values for these regressions slightly decreased from the state fixed 
effects regressions, again with the exception of the preapproved FHA-insured loan 
regression having the highest explanatory power at 24% of the regression being able to 
predict the dependent variable. Values this low would suggest that a number of other 
factors could be added to the regression in order to improve the model. Ideally, an R-
squared value of over 0.90 would suggest that the model is extremely reliable in 
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explaining the relationship between gerrymandering and racial discrimination in 
mortgage lending.  
Robustness 
Categorizing Applicants by Race 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects gerrymandering has on racial 
discrimination in mortgage lending. In order to construct the most parsimonious 
regressions, the race variables in the primary specifications (Tables 2-6) were 
consolidated into three categories: Black, White, or Other applicants and co-applicants. 
This decision was based on the fact that Black and non-disclosed racial categories 
showed the highest relevance in early specifications. And, while race not disclosed 
applicants had many statistically significant applicant/co-applicant pairings, the purpose 
of detailing applicant and co-applicant racial pairings is to discover which races are most 
heavily discriminated against in the mortgage lending process. Therefore, race not 
disclosed applicants were also put under the “Other” umbrella.  
This section more carefully separates Other into more detailed racial categories 
for applicant and co-applicant pairings. Comparing the coefficients from Table 7 
Columns 1 and 2 to Table 3 Columns 1 and 2, the FHA-insured loan regression 
coefficients stayed almost exactly the same. Black applicants who applied with a Black 
co-applicant are still 14.1 percentage points less likely to be approved for an FHA-
insured loan than a White applicant with a White co-applicant while White applicants 
who applied with a Black co-applicant are now 4.2 percentage points less likely to be 
approved for an FHA-insured loan than a White applicant with a White co-applicant, a 
decrease from 4.5 percentage points with the more consolidated applicant/co-applicant 
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variables. The conventional loan regression coefficient for a Black applicant with a Black 
co-applicant and a White applicant with a Black co-applicant were 26.5 and 13 
percentage points, respectively, less likely to be approved for a conventional loan than a 
White applicant with a White co-applicant. Both coefficients decreased in the new 
regression from 26.5 to 19 percentage points for the Black applicant with a Black co-
applicant and from 13 to 6.7 percentage points for the White applicant with a Black co-
applicant. While the coefficients changed from the more concise regression applicant/co-
applicant regression to the more detailed regression, their statistical significance 
remained the same as well as their overall all interpretation, which is that Black and 
White applicants with a Black co-applicant are less likely to be approved for a mortgage 
loan than a White applicant with a White co-applicant. Thus, the primary results using 
parsimonious racial categories are robust to alternative specifications with more detailed 
racial classifications.  
Table 7: Detailed Co-Applicant Pairings 
  1 2 
VARIABLES Conventional w/ Co-Applicants FHA-Insured w/ Co-Applicants 
Loan Amount -0.064*** -0.060*** 
 [0.001] [0.011] 
Income 0.105*** 0.173*** 
 [0.001] [0.010] 
Preapproved 0.183*** 0.161*** 
 [0.003] [0.013] 
Female Applicant -0.025*** 0.009 
 [0.002] [0.009] 
H Applicant H Co-Applicant -0.039*** -0.020 
 [0.005] [0.016] 
H Applicant Non-H Co-Applicant 0.018 -0.051 
 [0.011] [0.049] 
Non-H Applicant H Co-Applicant 0.011 -0.016 
 [0.011] [0.048] 
AI Applicant AI Co-Applicant -0.042* 0.110* 
 [0.023] [0.065] 
AI Applicant A Co-Applicant -0.095 0.462*** 
 [0.116] [0.047] 
AI Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.144   
 [0.183]   
AI Applicant ND Co-Applicant -0.272** 0.169 
 [0.121] [0.259] 
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AI Applicant No Co-Applicant -0.154*** 0.070 
 [0.013] [0.047] 
AI Applicant PI Co-Applicant -0.344** 0.411*** 
 [0.163] [0.022] 
A Applicant AI Co-Applicant 0.049 0.503*** 
 [0.154] [0.009] 
A Applicant A Co-Applicant 0.067*** -0.070 
 [0.006] [0.057] 
A Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.142* -0.360** 
 [0.079] [0.147] 
A Applicant ND Co-Applicant 0.045 -0.049 
 [0.047] [0.314] 
A Applicant No Co-Applicant -0.058*** -0.010 
 [0.005] [0.050] 
A Applicant PI Co-Applicant 0.055   
 [0.100]   
B Applicant AI Co-Applicant -0.332*** 0.074 
 [0.099] [0.226] 
B Applicant A Co-Applicant 0.021 -0.545*** 
 [0.056] [0.011] 
B Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.190*** -0.141*** 
 [0.007] [0.018] 
B Applicant ND Co-Applicant -0.245*** -0.085 
 [0.033] [0.074] 
B Applicant No Co-Applicant -0.247*** -0.131*** 
 [0.003] [0.012] 
B Applicant PI Co-Applicant -0.119 0.400*** 
 [0.118] [0.040] 
ND Applicant AI Co-Applicant -0.484***   
 [0.146]   
ND Applicant A Co-Applicant -0.205**   
 [0.085]   
ND Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.245*** -0.025 
 [0.081] [0.228] 
ND Applicant ND Co-Applicant -0.039*** -0.139*** 
 [0.006] [0.032] 
ND Applicant No Co-Applicant -0.202*** -0.202*** 
 [0.005] [0.026] 
ND Applicant PI Co-Applicant -0.070   
 [0.160]   
PI Applicant AI Co-Applicant -0.235 0.371*** 
 [0.184] [0.012] 
PI Applicant A Co-Applicant -0.237**   
 [0.108]   
PI Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.266   
 [0.173]   
PI Applicant ND Co-Applicant -0.140 -0.084 
 [0.123] [0.361] 
PI Applicant No Co-Applicant -0.156*** 0.121* 
 [0.014] [0.069] 
PI Applicant PI Co-Applicant -0.053** 0.150 
 [0.022] [0.093] 
W Applicant AI Co-Applicant -0.065** 0.169* 
 [0.028] [0.088] 
W Applicant A Co-Applicant 0.115*** 0.157* 
 [0.013] [0.095] 
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W Applicant B Co-Applicant -0.067*** -0.042 
 [0.024] [0.078] 
W Applicant ND Co-Applicant -0.050*** 0.034 
 [0.014] [0.046] 
W Applicant PI Co-Applicant -0.011 0.129 
 [0.034] [0.183] 
AI Applicant W Co-Applicant -0.019 0.177** 
 [0.029] [0.078] 
A Applicant W Co-Applicant 0.079*** 0.218** 
 [0.017] [0.107] 
B Applicant W Co-Applicant -0.046** 0.059 
 [0.020] [0.062] 
ND Applicant W Co-Applicant -0.044* 0.019 
 [0.026] [0.103] 
PI Applicant W Co-Applicant 0.024 0.064 
 [0.041] [0.163] 
Constant 0.513*** 0.137*** 
 [0.006] [0.043] 
Observations 255,699 13,792 
R-squared 0.069 0.052 
Notes: The applicant/co-applicant abbreviations are as follows: American Indian (AI), Asian (A), Black 
(B), Not Disclosed (ND), Pacific Islander (PI), White (W). Robust standard errors are noted in the 
parentheses below each coefficient estimate. The asterisks next to the coefficient estimates are indicative of 
the statistical level of significance: * denotes significance at the 0.10 level; ** denotes significance at the 
0.05 level; *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level.  
Conclusion 
 To conclude, the above regressions suggest that gerrymandering, on average, 
tends to increase the presence of racial discrimination in mortgage lending for a given 
state. Comparing the results from the regressions with the applicant/co-applicant 
interaction variables to the regressions without the Efficiency Gap, it is clear that the 
coefficients increased by at least a few percentage points as the models became stronger. 
The greater racial discrimination in mortgage lending in states with a high presence of 
gerrymandering has serious ramifications that are worth addressing. As it has been shown 
throughout this paper, racial discrimination in loan lending is still affecting minority 
applicants across the country. If the presence of gerrymandering exacerbates this issue, it 
begs the question of whether financial institutions in some states are complicit in the 
suppression of minority votes. As of the 26th Amendment passed in 1971, every 18-year-
old citizen of the United States is guaranteed the right to vote. With harmful practices like 
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loan discrimination and gerrymandering, politicians and institutions alike have found a 
way around the law so that for many minorities, their right to vote is under siege. Even 
though it seems trivial to pay attention to this issue because gerrymandering often only 
affects the election of one or two officials per state, over time and across the nation, this 
can drastically affect the legislation that is able to be passed at the national level. 
 While these models are cause for concern, further research and stronger models 
are necessary in order to identify causal effects and propose policy solutions. First, the 
base model of discrimination in the lending process could be strengthened by adding 
applicant’s and co-applicant’s credit and FICO scores into the model. As was previously 
mentioned, the Efficiency Gap is a general measure and is most certainly not an exact 
indication of whether a state has been gerrymandered. Gerrymandering is incredibly 
difficult to detect, therefore a more precise way to measure gerrymandering may not be 
available, as it is somewhat qualitative in nature whether district boundaries were 
manipulated. Even more difficult is the task of trying to show there were political or 
racial motivations in exploiting district plans and that those motivations in some way 
affected racially discriminatory practices of financial institutions. In order for reformation 
of the redistricting process to occur, it may take several more egregious offenses and a 
few more prominent court cases in order for all states to take actionable steps toward 
altering the way redistricting occurs.  
As has been prominent in this country throughout time, when a law is passed to 
prohibit a certain practice, new structures are put in place so as to continue the harmful 
practice while going undetected by those aiming to enforce the law. It is the reason 
systemic racism has permeated almost every aspect of life. Even though one may not be 
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an active participant in upholding the structural racism in this country, being passive is 
just as harmful. Standing by while institutions and politicians collaborate in some fashion 
under the table to deny minority individuals and families a mortgage loan so as to keep 
them in particular voting districts is what allows these practices to continue. Passing 
another law is not the solution; while that may help on a broad scale, the real change will 
come from the population’s awareness on issues such as this one and their holding 





Table 1: List of Variables and Data Sources 
  Sources 











 Black Applicant with Black Co-
Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
 Black Applicant with White 
Co-Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
 Black Applicant with Other Co-
Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
 White Applicant with Black 
Co-Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
 White Applicant with White 
Co-Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
 White Applicant with Other Co-
Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
 Other Applicant with Black Co-
Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
 Other Applicant with White Co-
Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
 Other Applicant with Other Co-
Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
Other Independent 
Variables: 
Loan Amount Same as dependent variable 
 Income Same as dependent variable 
 Preapproved Same as dependent variable 
 Female Same as dependent variable 
 Male Same as dependent variable 
 Hispanic Applicant with 
Hispanic Co-Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
 Hispanic Applicant with Non-
Hispanic Co-Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
 Non-Hispanic Applicant with 
Hispanic Co-Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
 Non-Hispanic Applicant with 
Non-Hispanic Co-Applicant 
Same as dependent variable 
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Table 2: FHA-Insured/Conventional Summary Statistics 
FHA-Insured Loan Applications 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Approved 13,792 0.498 0.500 
Efficiency Gap 13,792 0.092 0.076 
Black Applicant with Black Co-Applicant 13,792 0.056 0.230 
Black Applicant with White Co-Applicant 13,792 0.004 0.065 
Black Applicant with Other Co-Applicant 13,792 0.149 0.356 
White Applicant with Black Co-Applicant 13,792 0.003 0.054 
White Applicant with White Co-Applicant 13,792 0.310 0.463 
White Applicant with Other Co-Applicant 13,792 0.397 0.489 
Other Applicant with Black Co-Applicant 13,792 0.001 0.024 
Other Applicant with White Co-Applicant 13,792 0.006 0.077 
Other Applicant with Other Co-Applicant 13,792 0.074 0.262 
Conventional Loan Applications 
Approved 255,699 0.622 0.485 
Efficiency Gap 255,699 0.095 0.086 
Black Applicant with Black Co-Applicant 255,699 0.019 0.136 
Black Applicant with White Co-Applicant 255,699 0.002 0.047 
Black Applicant with Other Co-Applicant 255,699 0.094 0.291 
White Applicant with Black Co-Applicant 255,699 0.002 0.039 
White Applicant with White Co-Applicant 255,699 0.310 0.462 
White Applicant with Other Co-Applicant 255,699 0.440 0.496 
Other Applicant with Black Co-Applicant 255,699 0.0004 0.019 
Other Applicant with White Co-Applicant 255,699 0.005 0.070 
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